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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

In 2018, the Appellant/Cross-Respondent David J. Lujan (hereafter, "Lujan") obtained a
default judgment in the State Court of Guam against various parties who do not own, nor have
they ever owned, the real property in Hope, Idaho (hereafter, the "Subject Property"), at issue in
this matter. Lujan attempted to domesticate and execute the default judgment in 2019.
The Respondent/Cross-Appellant Junior Larry Hillbroom (hereafter, "Junior") prevailed
on summary judgment, by demonstrating to the district court in the proceedings below that Lujan's
judgment does not attach to the Subject Property and that each cause of action which would allow
Lujan' s judgment to attach to the Subject Property was legally and factually meritless.
Junior asked the district court to award him attorneys fees incurred in defense of Lujan's
legally and factually meritless Complaint under Idaho Code § 12-121, or, alternatively, that the
district court apportion fees for those portions of the Complaint found to lack legal or factual
support. The district court denied Junior's request for fees in its order granting summary judgment
and again when moved to reconsider the issue.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed the district court's final judgment.

Facts
The circumstances giving rise to this lawsuit are lengthy, complicated, largely irrelevant,
and, for the most part, not in the record below. In briefest terms, these parties have been engaged
in some form of litigation, in some forum, with or against one another, for nearly 30 years. The
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litigation has been largely adversarial since 2008, when Junior first accused Lujan of defrauding
him of tens of millions of dollars from Junior's inheritance. Since that time, the parties have filed
nine lawsuits in different federal court against one another and a number of lawsuits in the state
courts of Idaho, California, Hawaii, and Guam.
Most of those cases have been dismissed without resolving the underlying contentions
between the parties. Aside from the present matter, only one remaining case appears to be active.
That matter was filed by Junior against, inter alia, Lujan in the United States District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands in 2010. 1 In that case, Junior accuses Lujan oflegal malpractice, fraud,
conspiracy, and fiduciary duty breaches which diminished the value of his inheritance by tens of
millions of dollars. That case will ultimately be heard by a jury, although no trial date is presently
scheduled.
The undisputed facts in the record which are relevant to this appeal are straightforward.
On April 13, 2018, Junior admitted to Lujan, at a deposition in an unrelated matter, that he owned
real property located in Bonner County, Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 62,

,r 15. On September 7, 2018,

Lujan obtained a default judgment in the Superior Court of Guam against, inter alia, Junior in his
capacity as Trustee of the JLH Trust. R. Vol. I, p. 77-78.
On or about February 25, 2019, Lujan attempted to domesticate said judgment in Idaho.
R. Vol. I, p. 107-110.

1

Case No. CVl0-0009, U.S. District Court, Northern Mariana Islands.
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On October 24, 2019, Lujan filed a Complaint against, inter alia, Junior in his individual
capacity and in his capacity as Trustee of the JLH Trust. R. Vol. I, p, 8.
Lujan' s Complaint alleged four causes of action against Junior and the other Defendants.
Specifically, he alleged violations of Idaho's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (hereafter, the
"UVTA"), Breach of Contract, Constructive Trust, and a demand for a Declaratory Judgment. R.
Vol. I, pp, 8-15.
Through his Complaint, Lujan sought to unwind the 2008 conveyance from the Trustees
of the JLH Trust to Junior so that Lujan could execute the Guam default judgment against the
Subject Property. Tr. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 6-24. The Subject Property was acquired in 2006 by the
Trustees of the Junior Hillbroom Trust (a trust separate and distinct from the JLH Trust, whose
Trustees were not joined in this action). R. Vol. I, pp. 65-66. In August 2008, the Subject Property
was conveyed by the Trustees of the Junior Hillbroom Trust to Junior in his individual capacity.
R. Vol. I, p. 67.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Junior as to each of Lujan's
claims. R. Vol. I, p. 154.
II.

ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL

Under Idaho Code§ 12-121, an award of attorney fees on appeal "is appropriate when this
Court is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428, 438
(2004). "The appeal of a frivolous case is even more so." Urrutia v. Harrison, 156 Idaho 677,
682, 330 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2014). As demonstrated in the subjoined Cross-Appeal, Lujan's case
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in the district court was both frivolous and without foundation. An overall view of the case
establishes that this appeal was pursued unreasonably. Accordingly, this Court should award fees
to Junior in defense ofLujan's appeal.
Junior is not entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred in pursuit of his Cross-Appeal
unless Junior prevails and Lujan's defense thereof is found to be frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation.

Thus, in the event Junior prevails and Lujan's defense thereof is deemed

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, Junior asks this Court to award him attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12-121.

III.
A.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

The District Court Did Not Err in Dismissing Lujan's Claim Under the Uniform
Voidable Transactions Act.
1.

Summary.

The district court granted summary judgment dismissal of Lujan's Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act (hereafter, the "UVTA") claim on the grounds that his claim was untimely. R.
Vol. I, p. 149.
Specifically, the district court found that Lujan's claim was time-barred by operation of
LC. § 55-918, which states:

A cause of action with respect to a transfer or obligation under this act is
extinguished unless action is brought:
(1) Under section 55-913(1)(a), Idaho Code, not later than four (4) years
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later,
not later than one (1) year after the transfer or obligation was or
could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;
(2) Under section 55-913 ( 1)(b) or 5 5-914( 1), Idaho Code, not later than four
(4) years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or

4

(3) Under section 55-914(2), Idaho Code, not later than one (1) year after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
Id. (emphasis added).
The district court found the most probable inference from the undisputed facts in the record
is that the transfer of the Subject Property could reasonably have been discovered by Lujan in April
2018, when Junior told Lujan about the Subject Property at a deposition. R. Vol. I, pp. 148-149.
Because Lujan filed this action on October 24, 2019, more than one year after April 2018, the
district court concluded that any claim under the UVTA was untimely and entered summary
judgment in favor of Junior. Id. at p. 149. On appeal, Lujan argues it was error for the district
court to make this inference.
2.

Authority.

"When a court considers a motion for summary judgment in a case that would be tried to a
jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of
the party resisting the motion." G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851,
854 ( 1991 ). "The rule is different however when, as here, a jury trial has not been requested. In
that event, because the court would be the fact-finder at trial, on a summary judgment motion the
court is entitled to draw the most probable inferences from the undisputed evidence properly before
it, and may grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." P. 0.

Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007).
Inferences thus drawn by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the record reasonably
supports them. Shawverv. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 69192 (2004).
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3.

The district court's inference is reasonably supported by the record.

The district court's inference that Lujan reasonably could have discovered the transfer at
issue in April 2018 is reasonably supported by the record and should not be disturbed.
The district court's inference is supported by two undisputed facts. First, the district court
found "that the instrument transferring the subject property to Mr. Hillbroom individually, i.e.,
Instrument No. 756186, was recorded in Bonner County on August 4, 2008, and therefore, was a
matter of public record as of that date." R. Vol. I, p. 148. Second, the district court found it was
"an undisputed fact that Junior told Lujan at the deposition in April 2018, that he lived at 357
David Thompson Road in Hope, Idaho ... , and that he owned two houses on the subject property."

Id.
The Court's inference, that Lujan reasonably could have discovered the transfer in April
2018, is reasonably supported by these undisputed facts and therefore should not be disturbed on
appeal.
Lujan' s arguments on appeal appear to consist of the following:
i) The undisputed facts do not support the district court's inference that Lujan could have
discovered the transfer after April 2018;
ii) summary judgment was improper because of the possibility of conflicting inferences;
iii) Lujan exercised proper due diligence in filing suit after obtaining actual knowledge of
the transfer;
iv) the discovery rule applicable to fraud requires more than an awareness that something
is wrong, but requires actual knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud;

6

v) the existence of the quitclaim deed does not support an inference that Lujan reasonably
could have discovered the fraudulent nature of the transfer;
vi) there is no evidence that Lujan would know how to conduct a name search; and
vii) it was improper for the district court to impart constructive notice of the transaction to
Lujan.
Each of these arguments will be addressed in tum.
1.

The undisputed facts support the district court's inference.

Lujan argues that "no evidence was in the record to support the inference that Lujan could
have discovered the transaction" at issue more than a year before this suit was filed. Appellant's
Brief, pp. 7-8.

This argument is patently false. In the memorandum decision granting summary judgment
to Junior, the district court's inference is plainly supported by the deposition transcript, introduced
without objection by Junior in a declaration in support of summary judgment, wherein Junior told
Lujan he owned the Subject Property. R. Vol. I, p. 148. The district court also relied on portions
ofLujan's own declaration in opposition to summary judgment, wherein Lujan admits he learned
of the Subject Property at the deposition and that he used the information he obtained at the
deposition to obtain a litigation guarantee for the Subject Property, which litigation guarantee he
admits ultimately led to his discovery of the transaction at issue. Id. These facts support the district
court's inference and Lujan's argument that no evidence supports the inference is meritless.
What Lujan is really arguing is that the district court should have drawn a different
inference from the undisputed facts in the record. His argument is that the district court should
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have inferred from the record that he could not have reasonably discovered the transfer until
sometime after April 11, 2019, when he obtained the litigation guarantee. However, it is not the
role of an appellate court to substitute its own inferences for those of the district court if those
inferences are reasonably supported by the record. Shawver, 140 Idaho at 360-61, 93 P.3d at 69192. Because the district court's inferences are reasonably supported by the record, and because
Lujan's assignment of error on this issue lacks legal or factual support, this Court should affirm
the decision of the district court.
It should be noted that Lujan admits in his declaration that he used the information he

obtained at the April 2018 deposition, and evidently no other information, to domesticate a foreign
judgment in Bonner County, Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 105, ,-r 4. As part of that process, Lujan says he
ordered a litigation guarantee from a local title company which ultimately provided him with actual
knowledge of the transfer at issue. Id, at ,-r 5.
These facts prove that, not only was it correct for the district court to infer that Lujan
reasonably could have discovered the transfer at issue using just the information gleaned from his
deposition of Junior, but that Lujan did in fact discover the transfer at issue using just the
information gleaned from his deposition of Junior. That he actually discovered the transfer
using just the information he obtained at the deposition belies Lujan's argument that there is no
evidence supporting the district court's inference.
That he only obtained actual knowledge nearly one year after the deposition does not
diminish the fact that he plainly, and by his own admission, was in possession of all the information
he reasonably needed, and ultimately utilized, to discover the transfer at issue on April 13, 2018.

8

11.

No jury was requested in this matter so the district court was free to grant
summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences.

Lujan argues that "reasonable people could disagree as to whether Lujan exercised proper
due diligence so summary judgment was not proper." Appellant's Brief, p. 8. This argument is
premised on an incorrect statement oflaw. Because neither party requested a trial by jury, the
district court was free to make inferences from the undisputed facts in the record, despite the
possibility that those inferences may conflict, so long as those inferences are reasonably supported
by the record. P.O. Ventures, Inc., 144 Idaho at 237, 159 P.3d at 874.
As set forth in the preceding subsection, the district court's inferences are reasonably
supported by the record and Lujan's argument that summary judgment was improper because
reasonable people could reach conflicting inferences from the undisputed facts is not premised on
binding legal precedent and should be rejected.
111.

The amount of diligence exercised by Lujan is irrelevant as to whether the
statute of limitations expired on his UVTA claim.

As an apparent corollary to the preceding argument, Lujan argues that a reasonable person
could conclude that he exercised proper due diligence by filing his claim four months after he
obtained actual knowledge of transfer at issue. Appellant's Brief, p. 8.
This argument was not raised below and should not be considered at this stage. This Court
has a longstanding rule that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. KEB
Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2004) (citing Row v. State,
135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001)).
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However, even if the Court does consider this argument, it should be rejected as an
incorrect interpretation of the controlling statute of limitations.

Lujan's UVTA claim was

dismissed under I.C. § 55-918, which requires his claim to be filed "not later than one (1) year
after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered."
There is no due diligence exception to this rule. The district court found that Lujan's claim
accrued on April 13, 2018, at which time he reasonably could have discovered the transfer at issue,
and that it expired as a matter of law one year later. R. Vol. I, p 149. Whether Lujan acted
diligently after obtaining actual knowledge of the transfer is not relevant to the inquiry performed
by the district court and this argument should be rejected because it lacks merit and was not raised
in the proceedings below.
1v.

The discovery rule for ordinary fraud cited by Lujan has no application to
the UVTA's statute oflimitations.

Lujan also argues that "the discovery rule applicable to fraud requires more than an
awareness that something may be wrong but requires knowledge of the facts constituting fraud."

Appellant's Brief, p. 9 (citing Davis v. Tuma, 167 Idaho 267, 469 P.3d 595, 603 (2020)).
This is another argument that was not made to the district court and should not be
considered at this stage. KEB Enterprises, 140 Idaho at 752, 101 P.3d at 696.
To the extent this Court decides to consider Lujan's argument, it must be noted that his
reliance on Davis is gravely misplaced. The discovery exception at issue in this case, provided for
in I.C. § 55-918(1 ), was not at issue in Davis or any of the cases considered therein. Rather, Davis
dealt with the interpretation and application of the discovery exception for ordinary and
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constructive fraud provided in I.C. § 5-218(4). Those claims are subject to a requirement that they
must be brought within three years of "the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake." Id.
In interpreting Davis, this Court acknowledged the well-established rule that the discovery
exception in I.C. § 5-218(4) requires "knowledge of the facts constituting fraud." Davis, 167 Idaho
at 469 P.3d at 603.
However, this rule, and the authority provided by Lujan, only applies to claims for ordinary
fraud and constructive fraud. Lujan has not alleged an ordinary fraud or constructive fraud claim
and the rule discussed in Davis simply has no application in this matter. Furthermore, there does
not appear to be any authority in this jurisdiction extending the "actual knowledge of the facts"
requirement to the UVTA's statute oflimitations. Lujan, for his part, offers no such authority.
The legislature was clear in I.C. § 5-218(4) that a claim for fraud does not accrue until the
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud, whereas in I.C. 55-918, the
legislature was clear that this type of claim would accrue when the aggrieved party can reasonably
discover the transfer.
These are two different standards and to impose a requirement of "knowledge of the facts
constituting fraud," upon I.C. § 55-918(1) is redundant and inconsistent with regard to plain
language of the statute. Such an imposition would be redundant as I.C. § 55-918(1) already
provides that a claim accrues when it is actually discovered, and a requirement of "knowledge of
the facts constituting fraud,"is logically inconsistent with the fact that that a claim under I.C. § 55918(1) can accrue when it reasonably can be discovered.
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Ifwe were to impose the "knowledge of the facts" requirement on UVTA claims, we would
be left with a statute of limitations that accrues when the aggrieved party 1) actually discovers the
transfer or 2) when the party discovers "knowledge of the facts constituting fraud." In other words,
a claim would accrue upon actual knowledge or actual knowledge. This absurd result renders null
and void the plain language of half the statute. 2 Thus, the requirement that a party discover "actual
knowledge of the facts" before a claim under I.C. § 5-218(4) accrues has no bearing on when a
UVTA claim accrues.
Because this issue was not made below, nor is it supported by legal authority, this argument
should be rejected.
v.

Whether the quitclaim deed imparts knowledge of the fraudulent nature of
the transaction was not raised below or supported by any authority on
appeal.

Lujan argues that even if he could have discovered the transfer at issue by searching the
records of Bonner County, nothing in the record supports an inference that a title search would
reveal the fraudulent nature of the transaction. Appellant's Brief, p. 9. Indeed, nothing in the
record whatsoever reveals the fraudulent nature of the transaction.
The quitclaim deed itself does not disclose how the transaction might have been fraudulent.
Whatever information Lujan obtained from the litigation guarantee, which he claims led to the
discovery of the allegedly fraudulent transfer3 , has not been disclosed. To date, Lujan has refused

2
"It should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be
void, superfluous, or redundant." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,310,208 P.3d 289,292 (2009).

3

E.g., "The Plaintiff herein acknowledges actual notice in March of 2019 by way of obtaining a title search and
obtaining a Litigation Guarantee as any former JLH Trust ownership of any subject property, and filing this action

12

to explain how he came know that the transfer was fraudulent or the facts supporting that assertion.
Aside from Lujan's own inadmissible speculation and innuendo, there is no evidence of fraudulent
conduct on the part of Junior or the other defendants whatsoever.
Lujan's claims for fraud were at all times conclusory and speculative, including the
allegations made in his opening brief. The district court explicitly found "Lujan's complaint made
only general, conclusory allegations that the transfer of the subject property was fraudulent and
for the purpose of defrauding creditors. However, Mr. Lujan fails to plead with any particularity
facts which would create a material issue of fact as to each element of a fraud claim. Similarly,
his declaration is also devoid of any facts or evidence sufficient to create a material issue of fact
to support each element of fraud." R. Vol. I, pp. 150-151. "There are no allegations in either the
Complaint or Declaration disclosing particular acts of fraud or concealment by any of the
defendants to keep Mr. Lujan from learning about the July 30, 2008 transfer." Id. at 151.
The fact is, the instrument documenting the transfer does not establish the fraudulent nature
of the transaction because it simply was not fraudulent.
This Court need not consider this argument, however, because it was not raised at any point
in the proceedings below. At no point did Lujan ever argue that his claim would only accrue when
he discovered or could have discovered the fraudulent nature of the transaction. Similarly, he

on October 24, 2019, less than one year from actual knowledge, and within a [sic] one year from when Plaintiff
reasonably could have discovered said transfer." R. Vol. I, pp. 188-189.
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provides no authority or argument in his opening brief as to why this Court should reverse the
district court on these grounds. 4 Accordingly, this argument should be rejected.
v1.

Whether Lujan knew how to conduct a name search is irrelevant.

Lujan argues that "it is reasonable to assume that Lujan is not from Idaho and would have
no reason to know what a name search was." Appellant's Brief, p. 10. Therefore, he argues, the
district court committed error when it inferred that Lujan could have conducted a name search.
This argument is disingenuous. Lujan is a real estate attorney licensed to practice law in
Guam and the United States District Courts. 5 He was educated at the University of Notre Dame
Law School. Lujan is an extraordinarily sophisticated litigant and knows how to search property
records.
Regardless of his sophistication or lack thereof, the district court did not 'infer' the Lujan
could have conducted a name search. The district court inferred that Lujan reasonably could have
discovered the transfer at issue given what he knew in April 2018. R. Vol. I, pp. 148-149.
Conducting a name search was simply an example given by the district court as to how Lujan could
have discovered the transfer.
Alternatively, Lujan could have employed an asset location service, a private investigator,
he could have searched Bonner County's online property records which are indexed by grantor
and grantee's name from 1986 through present, 6 he could have simply called the Bonner County

4
"This Court has consistently followed the rule that it will not review the actions of a district court which have not
been specifically assigned as error[,] [e]specially where there are no authorities cited nor argument contained in the
briefs upon the question." State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983).
5
See, https://guambar.org/system/homes/directory_ details/326
6
See, https://ere corder. bonnercountyid.gov/bonnerweb/search/DOCSEARCH98 S5
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recorder's office and requested property records in Junior's name, or he could have (and in fact,
did) obtained this very information from a title company. Each of these tools are available to both
reasonable persons and practicing real estate attorneys.
This Court need not consider, however, whether Lujan, a real estate attorney educated at
one of this country's top law schools, knew or should have known how to search Idaho's public
land records because this issue was not raised below and is premised on a misunderstanding of the
district court's decision.
v11.

The district court did not impart constructive knowledge of the transfer to
Lujan.

Finally, Lujan argues that it was improper for the district court to impart constructive
knowledge of the transfer to Lujan. Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11.
Lujan moved the district court for reconsideration of this very issue. In its memorandum
decision denying reconsideration, the district court emphasized that it did not impart constructive
knowledge of the transfer to Lujan. R. Vol. I, p, 225, n 2. Because the Court did not make an
adverse ruling against Lujan on this issue, this issue is not appealable and should not be considered
by the Court.
However, it bears noting that the district court did not find that Lujan reasonably could
have discovered the transfer at issue by virtue of the mere fact that it was recorded. Had this been
the case, the district court certainly would have determined that Lujan's claim expired in August
2009. However, the district court inferred that the transfer "could reasonably have been discovered
by Mr. Lujan in April 2018." R. Vol. I, p. 148.
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Conclusion.

4.

For the reasons set forth above, this Court should find that the inferences made by the
district court are supported by the record and affirm the summary judgment dismissal of Lujan' s
UVTAclaim.
B.

Lujan Failed to Meet his Burden on Summary Judgment regarding the
Imposition of a Constructive Trust.

Junior argued in his motion for summary judgment that Lujan failed to adequately plead a
claim for the imposition of a constructive trust and that such a claim, even if it were adequately
pled, was barred by the statute of limitations. R. Vol. I, p. 57.
Junior supported his argument with reference to the matter of Witt v. Jones, which
established the requirement that a party seeking the imposition of constructive trust premised on
fraudulent acts must plead with particularity the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud. Witt

v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474, 477 (1986).
Additionally, Junior argued that, to the extent Lujan's claim for a constructive trust was
based on nonfraudulent, but otherwise wrongful conduct, such claims were barred by I.C. §§ 5217 and 5-224. R. Vol. I, p. 57-58.
In his reply brief, Lujan argued that his claim for a constructive trust should survive
summary judgment because:

Plaintiff herein has sufficiently plead through the pleadings the elements necessary
to

impose a Construcli\le Trust as an epproprietc remedy herein.

R. Vol. I, p. 96.
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This single, conclusory sentence was the entirety of Lujan's response to Junior's motion
for summary judgment.
The district court did not err in dismissing Lujan's constructive trust claim because, in
order to survive summary judgment, a non-moving party may not simply rely upon mere
allegations in the pleadings but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(c); see Rhodeshouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211 868 P.2d 1224, 1227
(1994). Furthermore, the non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more than
speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Zimmerman v.
Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 (1996).

If the non-moving

party does not provide such a response, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
the party. Id. (emphasis added). Mere recitation of the elements of a claim for fraud, without
specific supporting facts, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Hopper v. Swinnerton,
155 Idaho 801, 809, 317 P.3d 698, 706 (2013).
Lujan relied solely upon his pleadings in resisting summary judgment on this issue. R.
Vol. I, p. 96. The district court found no allegations in the record disclosing particular acts of any
element fraud. R. Vol. I, p. 150-151. To the extent Lujan's Complaint alleged fraud, the district
court found those allegations merely recited the factors listed in LC. § 55-913 or that the allegations
were inadmissibly conclusory. Id. For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment on Lujan's constructive trust claim. Indeed, under Zimmerman, the district
court was constrained to enter summary judgment against Lujan for his failure to come forward
with evidence to support his claim, aside from more speculation.
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And speculation is all Lujan has to offer this Court on appeal. He argues that the record
shows evidence of a secret trust set up to defraud Lujan of fees owed by Junior. Appellant's Brief,
110-13. The record shows nothing of the sort, and Lujan makes no effort to provide us with
citations supporting these baseless accusations. Admittedly, the record discloses the existence of
two trusts, but there is no evidence that the existence of either trust was concealed from Lujan or
that its purpose was to defraud anyone, or that any fraud actually took place. R. Vol. I, p. 151.
Importantly, and contrary to Lujan's claims, there is no evidence that Junior was ever
individually obligated to pay Lujan's attorney fees or any other monies. Lujan's assertion that he
is entitled to a constructive trust over the Subject Property, which has been owned by Junior
individually since 2008, because it would be "unconscionable for [him] to retain title to this
property unless and until he pays Lujan's judgment" of upwards of $3,700,000 (actually, in excess
of $6,000,000 once pre-judgment interest is factored in) is not based on any objective, admissible
fact or good faith legal argument and should not be entertained by this Court.
C.

Any Error in the Denial of Lujan's Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery
was Invited.

Lujan argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to conduct
additional discovery and that this case should be remanded so that he can conduct discovery before
responding to summary judgment.
Although the district court could have stated the grounds for its decision on this matter with
more specificity, this issue is not subject to appeal because Lujan acquiesced in and invited the
district court to make the challenged ruling.
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This Court has continually held that a party cannot "successfully complain of errors [the
party] has acquiesced in or invited." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,833,243 P.3d 642, 649
(2010). "The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when [the
party's] own conduct induces the commission of the error." Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106,
205 P.3d 1235, 1242 (2009). Because the party invited the error, such errors are not reversible.
Id. "The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an
important role in prompting a trial court to [take certain action] from later challenging that [action]
on appeal." McNichols, 149 Idaho at 834, 243 P.3d at 650.
Specifically, Lujan argued in his briefing, at the summary judgment hearing, and in his
motion for reconsideration that the evidence in the record was sufficient to withstand summary
judgment. For example, in his brief opposing summary judgment, Lujan made the following
arguments:
Additionally, Plaintiff in his declaration has specifically articulated
he did not know or have actual knowledge of the transfer until after
April 11, 2019 ... This action having been brought October 23, 2019,
falls within one year form [sic] the date the transfer was reasonably
discovered, and therefore has been timely commenced pursuant to
LC. § 55-918(1).
R. Vol. I, p. 93.
The facts of the complaint and as set forth in this memorandum
clearly articulate Respondent Waibel individually and in his
capacity as Trustee of the JLH Trust contracted for the services of
Plaintiff. .. The non-payment under this contract for services, and the
breach thereof, which forms the basis of the Judgment obtained in
the Superior Court of Guam on September 7, 2018, and therefore the
breach of contract claims should not be dismissed.
Id. at p. 94.
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Plaintiff has already been established as a judgment creditor based
upon the facts and grounds contained in the complaint. These facts
support the claim, the Respondent Junior, was actively involved and
a possible co-conspirator, and the facts as set forth are sufficient to
qualify the transfer of the Hope Idaho Property from the JLH Trust
to Junior individually, as a fraudulent transfer and to be set aside
under the UVT A.
Id.

Plaintiff herein has sufficiently plead through the pleadings the
elements necessary to impose a Constructive Trust as an appropriate
remedy herein.
R. Vol. I, p. 96.
Subsequently, at the summary judgment hearing, counsel for Lujan argued:
[a]nd in this case, though we believe that those were fraudulent
transfers under the UVTA, if they were not considered to be to the
level of fraud, the facts that are set forth in the complaint and the
sworn affidavits do support that those were wrongful conduct on
behalf of the beneficiary and trustee transferring unto himself,
wherein Mr. Lujan would be entitled to the remedy of a constructive
trust.
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 28-29
[s]econdarily, in regards to the declaratory relief, the complaint sets
forth all the facts and allegations ...
Tr. Vol. I, p. 29.
[t]hose facts as alleged both in the complaint as well as alleged in
the declaration of David Lujan and in response to the motion for
summary judgment. .. we believe that Mr. Lujan survived the
summary judgment for the purposes of setting aside the transfer
under the UVTA as a fraudulent transfer as well as, if not fraudulent,
a constructive trust remedy on behalf of Mr. Lujan as a judgment
creditor against the trust.
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 31-32.
After the district court entered summary judgment dismissing his complaint, Lujan filed a
motion for reconsideration. In his motion for reconsideration, he maintained that the UVTA claim
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should not have been dismissed because the facts in the record showed that he obtained actual
knowledge of the transfer in March 2019. R. Vol. I, pp. 188-189. Although this allegation was
not supported by admissible evidence and his motion for reconsideration was denied, it shows that
he acquiesced in the district court's denial of his Rule 56(d) motion because he moved the district
court to reconsider its decision based only on the facts already in the record. He did not attempt
to introduce any new facts which might bear on the district court's grant of summary judgment,
nor did he argue that the district court should have granted his motion to conduct additional
discovery, or that had he been permitted to conduct additional discovery he would have presented
specific facts to overcome summary judgment.
Finally, in his opening brief in this appeal, Lujan argues that the facts (or the alleged lack
thereof) in the record at the time summary judgment was entered required the district court to rule
in his favor on the UVTA claim and on the constructive trust claim. Appellant's Brief, generally.
Lujan cannot be heard to simultaneously argue he had presented facts sufficient to
overcome summary judgment and that he lacked those same facts. This is an impermissible
inconsistency. Although the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( d) permits a party to assert as many
inconsistent claims and defenses as she has in her pleadings, there is no such corollary under Rule
56. Rule 56(d) only allows a party to seek additional time to conduct discovery before summary
judgment if it is shown "by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
facts essential to justify its opposition ... "
"A party seeking a continuance under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) "has the burden
of setting out what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify their opposition,
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making clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment." Jenkins

v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2004)
As demonstrated above, Lujan failed to carry that burden by repeatedly arguing that the
allegations and facts in the record supported his claims and were sufficient to overcome summary
judgment. Implicit in this argument is that he did not need to conduct any additional discovery in
order to survive summary judgment. If Lujan truly was unable to present certain facts essential to
justify his opposition to summary judgment, he should have maintained that position. He did not
do so and expressly invited the district court to consider whether he had in fact set forth facts and
allegations sufficient to withstand summary judgment. That the ruling was ultimately averse to
his case is of no consequence; he invited the district court to rule on this very issue and he cannot
be heard to complain that it was error for the court to have done so over his motion to conduct
additional discovery. He failed to carry the burden required of him under a Rule 56(d) motion
and, to the extent the district court erred by denying his motion, that error was invited by Lujan
and is not appealable. Thomson, 147 Idaho at 106, 205 P.3d at 1242.

D.

Lujan is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Lujan argues that if he prevails in this appeal, he is entitled to attorney fees under LC. §
12-121. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. His argument in support of the claim for fees is that there is no
evidence in the record to support the district court's inference that a "name search" could have
easily revealed the transaction at issue. Id.
Lujan misstates the inference that was drawn by the district court and asks this Court to
ignore the evidence in the record the district court relied upon in reaching the inference it did make.
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It was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation for Junior to defend the appeal on these

grounds.
Additionally, Lujan argues "the law is clear that Idaho's Constructive Notice statute, Idaho
Code

,r 55-811."

Appellant's Brief, p. 13. This argument is incomplete and does not provide a

basis for fees even if Lujan prevails on appeal.
E.

Conclusion.

For the reasons stated above, Junior asks this Court to affirm the summary judgment
dismissal ofLujan's constructive trust and UVTA claims and to affirm the denial ofLujan's 56(d)
motion.
IV.
A.

CROSS-APPEAL

The district court erred in denying fees to Junior under I.C. § 12-121.

I.

Facts.

Junior argued in his motion for summary judgment that he should be awarded attorney fees
incurred in defense of Lujan's Complaint under I.C. § 12-121 on the grounds that the claims
asserted therein were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. R. Vol. I, pp. 58-59.
In his response brief, Lujan disputed Junior's claim for fees under I.C. § 12-121. The
entirety of his defense follows:
The Plaintiff herein has raised significant genuine issues of material
fact concerning the Defendant's herein [sic] and the matters before
the court and his request for attorney fees and costs should be
denied.
R. Vol. I, p. 97.
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Despite Lujan's failure to provide a meaningful response to Junior's assertions that the
Complaint was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation, the district court relied upon the
proposition that "[ a]n award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 is not a matter of
right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when this Court, in its discretion, is left with
the abiding belief that the case was brough, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonable, or
without foundation .... Moreover, [w]hen deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under
LC. § 12-121, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account. .. " set forth in Budget
Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 850, 419 P.3d 1139, 1148 (2018). R. Vol. I, p.154.

Relying upon that proposition, the district court held:
Even though the plaintiffs claims have been dismissed on summary
judgment, this Court, in the exercise of its discretion, and taking into
account the entire course of the litigation, is not left with the abiding
belief that this case was brought or pursued by the plaintiffs
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Therefore,
attorney fees shall not be awarded.
Id.

Junior moved the district court to reconsider this decision, setting forth additional argument
and authority in support of his claim for attorney fees under LC. § 12-121. R. Vol. I, p. 166.
Specifically, Junior provided the district court with the following authority:
Attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 may be apportioned, in that a
district court may award fees for frivolous claims or issues while
declining to award them in connection with legitimate ones.
Additionally, it is no longer enough for the non-prevailing party to
have raised a single legitimate issue in order to be immunized from
attorney fees under LC. § 12-121. Although a district court is not
required to apportion fees, it may do so when the non-prevailing
party failed to argue the issues in "good faith" or act "with a
reasonable basis in fact or law.

24

Galvin v. City of Middleton, 164 Idaho 642, 648, 434 P.3d 817, 823 (2019). R. Vol. I, pp. 167168.

Junior then asked the district court to consider whether any of the four causes of action
brought by Lujan were made with a reasonable basis in fact or law or brought in good faith.
1.

Breach of contract

With respect to Lujan's breach of contract claim, Junior pointed out that Paragraph XIX of
Lujan' s Complaint, under the section titled Causes of Action, alleged that "Defendants have
breached their contractual obligations under the contract and/or agreement with Plaintiffs and such
breach is without justification or legal cause." Id. at 168. Junior argued that this allegation put
Junior on notice of a claim for breach of contract and, for this reason, he moved for summary
judgment arguing that any such claim was plainly barred the five-year statute of limitations
contained within LC. § 5-216. Id.
Junior noted to the district court that Lujan resisted summary judgment on the breach of
contract claim in his summary judgment briefing, though the brief failed to present a single fact or
legal argument as to why his claim was not barred by LC. § 5-216. Id. at 169. Junior also noted
that Lujan advanced no good-faith legal argument for avoiding, providing an exception to, or
reversing LC. § 5-216 or why the limitations period may have been tolled. Id.
In sum, Lujan resisted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim without a factual
or legal basis. Because there simply was no factual or legal basis supporting his resistance to
summary judgment, Junior argued this claim was not reasonable based in fact or law and that the
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district court should apportion fees to Junior insofar as he was required to defend against Lujan's
breach of contract claim. Id. at 170.
Junior also noted to the district court that counsel for Lujan withdrew the breach of contract
claim at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Id. Although no transcript was
available at the time this motion was made, the record before this Court supports Junior's
argument:
THE COURT: I just want to be clear that the issue in Bonner County is
that there is a piece ofreal property owned by - titled in Junior Hillbroom's name.
So your Mr. Lujan is trying to get that property?
MR. HICKEY: Yes.
MR. FEATHERSTON: He is not seeking any kind of further judgment
against Mr. Hillbroom. He is just wanting to set aside that transfer for purposes of
exercising on the judgment he already has.
So, the breach of contract claims and the like are factual allegations as to
what the basis-the basis of his claims to set aside the transfer and the basis for
factually why he has a judgment if you will.
But no he is not seeking anything other than the setting aside of that transfer
so that he can effectively execute on that.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 6-24.

Junior argued to the district court that this admission was grounds for an award of attorney
fees due to its similarity to Petrus Family Tr. Dated May 1, 1991 v. Kirk, 163 Idaho 490,493,415
P.3d 358, 361 (2018). In that case, this Court affirmed the decision of a district court which
apportioned fees to the prevailing party where the non-prevailing party acceded to summary
judgment at oral argument of a conspiracy-to-defraud claim. The district court in Petrus found
that the conspiracy claim was brough frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, stating:
"[the plaintiff] acceded to the entry of summary judgment against that claim. [The plaintiff] has
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given the Court no reason to believe it was founded on much of anything but conjecture." Id, at
502,371.
Junior then argued that, unlike the defendant in Petrus, Lujan's claim was not even based
in as much as conjecture. R. Vol. I, p. 170. According to counsel, it was alleged only as factual
support for Lujan's other claims, not as an independent cause of action. Tr. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 6-24.
However, if this allegation was only provided as factual support, its presence in the complaint
under the causes of action section, and Lujan's resistance to summary judgment of this issue, then
becomes frivolous and unreasonable.
Junior asked the district court to find that the inclusion of a breach of contract claim in the
complaint, and Lujan's opposition to summary judgment, was frivolous, unreasonable, and
without foundation and, pursuant to Petrus, it would be appropriate to apportion fees to Junior
insofar as he was required to defend against Lujan's breach of contract claim. Id.
ii) Declaratory relief
Lujan asked the district court to determine his right, title, interest, and the priority of his
judgment against the Subject Property. R. Vol. I, p 15. Junior moved for summary judgment
against Lujan's declaratory judgment claim arguing that Lujan does not have, nor has he ever had,
any right, title, or interest in the Subject Property or any property in Bonner County, and asked the
district court to award fees incurred in the defense of this frivolous, unreasonable, and
foundationless claim. Id. at 55. Again, Lujan resisted summary judgment on this issue but failed
to present any evidence or argument as to how his judgment attached to the Subject Property. Id.
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at 94-95. The district court found in favor of Junior on this issue but refused to award fees incurred
in defense of this claim. Id. at 152-154.
Junior moved for reconsideration of this issue, specifically noting that the district court had
the discretion to apportion fees for this individual claim if it was found to be frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. at 172.
Specifically, Junior argued that Lujan's Complaint, and his opposition to summary
judgment, failed to provide legal or factual support as to how his judgment could attach to the
Subject Property, or any other real property. Id. at 170. Junior pointed out that, by his own
admission, Lujan ordered and reviewed a litigation guarantee prior to filing this lawsuit. Id. at
171. That litigation guarantee showed that title to the Subject Property was not vested in the names
of any of his judgment debtors. Id. Nevertheless, Lujan demanded the district court declare his
right, title, and the priority of his judgment against the Subject Property.
Junior analogized these circumstances to the matter of Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136
Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001). In that case, this Court affirmed the decision of a district court to
apportion fees to the prevailing party who had been wrongly named in the lawsuit. Id., 792 at 789799, 41 at 266-227. In that matter, the plaintiff persisted in its claim for relief against the defendant
even though it knew the defendant did not own the property at issue.
The record in that matter showed that the plaintiffs in that matter failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation into the identity of the property owners before filing suit and maintained
their action after learning that the defendants lacked any ownership interest in the property at issue.
Id., 792 at 799, 41 at 227.
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Junior argued that, like Wait, Lujan named the wrong party. He could not obtain the
declaratory relief he sought because none of the named defendants owned real property in Bonner
County. Unlike Wait, however, Lujan did conduct an investigation into the identity of the proper
parties before filing suit. His litigation guarantee revealed that the property was vested in Junior's
name. Junior argued, on these grounds, it was frivolous, unreasonable, and foundationless for
Lujan to bring or maintain his declaratory relief claim and, under Wait, it would be appropriate to
apportion fees to Junior for defending the same. R. Vol. I, p 172.
iii)

Constructive Trust

Junior moved for summary judgment against Lujan' s constructive trust claim, arguing that
Lujan's complaint failed to allege any of the elements of fraud with the required degree of
specificity and that they were time-barred. Id. at 57-58.
Lujan's defense to summary judgment on this issue was that he had "sufficiently plead
through the pleadings the elements necessary to impose a Constructive Trust as an appropriate
remedy herein." Id. at 96. The district court ruled in Junior's favor and dismissed Lujan's
constructive trust claim for the failure to allege a single element of fraud with the required degree
of specificity but refused to award fees to Junior on the grounds that the claim lacked foundation.
Id. at 151.

Junior moved for reconsideration on this issue, pointing out that this, like the claim in
Petrus, was based on nothing more than conjecture. Id. at 172. Additionally, he argued that

Lujan's failure to allege or support a single element fraud necessary to support his constructive
trust claim was definitionally a claim brought and pursued "without foundation." Id. at 173. Junior
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argued that it is difficult to conceive of a claim more lacking in foundation than one which fails to
allege or support a single required element. Id. For these reasons, Junior asked the district court
to find apportion fees insofar as he was required to defend Lujan's foundationless constructive
trust claim. Id. at 174.
1v.

UVTA Claim

Finally, Junior asked the district to apportion fees incurred in defense of Lujan's UVTA
claim. Id. Junior set forth two bases for this request, first, that like his constructive trust claim,
Lujan's UVTA claim was necessarily premised upon fraud. Id. at 175. Because he was unable to
support a single element of fraud in support of his claim for a constructive trust, he was similarly
unable to support his UVTA claim, even ifhe were able to show his claim was timely. Id. Second,
Junior argued that Lujan's defense of the UVTA claim was premised on an unreasonable
interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, specifically his assertion that his claim only
accrued when he obtained actual knowledge of the transfer at issue. Id. at 174. Junior argued that
Lujan repeatedly ignored that half of the statute of limitations which plainly states that a UVTA
claim also can accrue when the allegedly aggrieved party reasonably could have discovered the
transfer. Id.
For these reasons, Junior asked the district court to apportion attorney fees incurred in
defense of this claim on the grounds that the claim, and the defense thereof, lacked any reasonable
basis in fact or law. Id. at 175-176.
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Lujan filed a response to Junior's motion for reconsideration, simply noting that the court
acted within its discretion to deny fees. Id. at 189. He did not address any of the specific issues
raised by Junior.
In its memorandum decision denying Junior's motion for reconsideration, the district court
held:
Upon consideration of the arguments made in Defendant's Motion
for Reconsideration, this Court, acting within its discretion, once
again finds that even though all the plaintiffs claims have been
dismissed on summary judgment, after taking into account the entire
course of the litigation, this Court is not left with the abiding belief
that this case was brought or pursued by the plaintiff frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation.
Id. at 226. (emphasis in original).
Junior appeals the district court's denial of fees to Junior under LC. § 12-121 as an abuse
of discretion.
2.

Authority.

"An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject
to an abuse of discretion standard of review." Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 716, 378 P.3d 464,
506 (2016). "When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the sequence
of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863,
421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
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3.

Argument.

The first question is whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion.
In this matter, although the district court cursorily states that it was acting within its
discretion, it does not appear to recognize that it had the discretion to apportion fees for individual
claims. R. Vol. I, p. 226. Rather, the district court states that "after taking into account the entire
course of the litigation, this Court is not left with the abiding belief that this case was brought or
pursued by the plaintiff frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. Thus, it does not
appear that the district court correctly perceived that attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 may be
apportioned, in that a district court may award fees for frivolous claims or issues while declining
to award them in connection with legitimate ones. Galvin, 4 Idaho at 648, 434 P.3d at 823.
The second prong of the analysis is to determine whether the district court acted within the
outer bounds of its discretion. It does not appear that the district court erred in this regard, because
denying fees entirely was within the bounds of its discretion on this issue.
The third prong is whether the district court acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it.
The specific choices available to the court were to 1) deny fees entirely, 2) award fees for
the entire case, or 3) to apportion fees for frivolous claims or issues while declining to award them
in connection with legitimate ones. The district court chose to deny fees entirely.
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The question becomes whether the district court acted consistently with the legal standard
applicable to denying fees entirely. It did not.
The court's reliance upon Budget Truck was not the correct legal standard to be applied in
this case. In Budget Truck, this Court citedMichalkv. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d 580,
591 (2009) for the following rule:
Moreover, "[w ]hen deciding whether attorney fees should be
awarded under LC.§ 12-121, the entire course of the litigation must
be taken into account and if there is at least one legitimate issue
presented, attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing
party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation."
Budget Truck Sales, LLC, 163 Idaho at 850, 419 P .3d at 1148.

The Michalk decision cites McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844
(2003) for this rule, while McGrew cited Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed.
Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001) for the rule.

The rule discussed in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., and cited by McGrew, Michalk,
Budget Truck, and the district court, however, was explicitly abrogated by this Court in Idaho
Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,329 P.3d 1080 (2014). Thus, to the extent

it refused to award fees to Junior on the basis the Lujan raised one legitimate issue, the district
court failed to act consistently with the correct legal standard.
Today, "it is no longer enough for non-prevailing party to have raised a single legitimate
issue in order to be immunized from attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121." Fitzpatrick
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Trustees of Fitzpatrick Revocable Tr. v. Kent Trustees of Alan & Sherry Kent Living Tr. Dated
11/07/2003, 166 Idaho 365,458 P.3d 943, 951 (2020).
Although the district court is not required to apportion fees, it is required to take a holistic
view to determine whether the standard for an award of fees under I.C. § 12-121 has been met. Id.
Under this more holistic view, courts are instructed to examine whether the non-prevailing party
argued the issues in "good faith" or acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Galvin v.
City ofMiddleton, 164 Idaho 642, 648, 434 P.3d 817, 823 (2019).
Although Junior asked the court to consider whether Lujan argued any of his four causes
of action in good faith, or whether he acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the district
court failed to engage in that analysis. As a result, the district court did not act consistently with
the legal standard available to it and its decision to deny fees to Junior was an abuse of discretion.
Nor can it be said that the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason,
because no reasons supporting its decision are provided. In Fitzpatrick, for example, the district
court declined to apportion fees because the non-prevailing party's case centered around its
argument for an exception to the merger doctrine, and that the Fitzpatricks made that argument in
good faith. Fitzpatrick, 166 Idaho 365, 458 P.3d at 951 (2020). There was no such analysis
provided in this case.
Here, we cannot tell from the district court's decisions denying fees to Junior under I.C. §
12-121 whether it believed that Lujan's case centered around a legitimate issue that was argued in
good faith like Fitzpatrick. The court merely concludes that, viewed as a whole, it was not left
with the abiding belief that Lujan's case was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or
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without foundation. This belief is difficult to square with the record. The district court found that
Lujan failed to allege or support a single element of a claim for fraud. Lujan withdrew his breach
of contract claim at the summary judgment hearing, and he was unable to provide any legal or
factual support for his claim that his judgment had attached the Subject Property. Absent any
express reasoning by the district court, a holistic view of the record, including the district court's
own findings, strongly suggests that Lujan did not argue the issues herein in "good faith" or act
"with a reasonable basis in fact or law."
For these reasons, this Court should find that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to apportion fees to Junior under LC. § 12-121. Junior asks this Court to reverse the
district court's decision and find that the record shows that each, or some, ofLujan's claims were
not made in good faith or with a reasonable basis in fact in law and instruct the district court to
make further findings in connection with the amount of fees to apportion to each claim.
Alternatively, Junior asks this Court to remand this issue to the district court with instructions to
reconsider the issue applying the correct legal standard.
V.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Junior respectfully asks that this Court reject Lujan's appeal
and grant Junior's cross-appeal.
DATED this 7th day of January 2021.
Berg, McLaughlin, & Nelson, CHTD
ls/Josh Hickey
Josh Hickey
Attorney at Law
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